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BANE OF RURAL CREDIT MARKET: PRESENCE OF MONEY 
LENDER OR ABSENCE OF STRUCTURAL SYNCHRONICITY 
 
        Saswati Choudhury1 
                                 
Introduction 
 
Working out ways to lift people out of poverty is a key objective within development 
economics. While there is a great deal of rhetoric on this subject, very little has been 
understood about what concrete steps can be taken. One policy area that has attracted a 
lot of theoretical attention is credit, access to which is often seen as critical in enabling 
people to transform their production and employment activities and to exit poverty. There 
is, however, a great deal of skepticism as to whether interventions in credit market are 
capable of reaching the poor. Here, there are two opposing views: the first view, which 
has been dominant for much of the post-war period, states that expansion of formal 
lending institutions such as State sponsored commercial banks should be engines of 
structural change and poverty reduction in rural areas. A second view that does not 
dispute access to credit is critical to poverty reduction, however, views that government 
intervention in credit market is either ineffective or counterproductive and cannot 
canalize credit for the marginalized due to administrative impediments arising from multi 
agency system (the Central government, the State government, the Local government and 
the banks). Formal credit in rural areas will, therefore, tend to be captured by rural elites. 
The elite capture combined with the imposition of interest rate ceilings can lead to 
financial dualism where formal concessional funds are concentrated in the hands of the 
powerful few and terms in informal markets. Thus expansion of subsidized formal credit 
can have the unintended consequence of undermining rural development and increasing 
rural poverty.  
 
Of the total 1000 million populations in India, approximately 720 million people live in 
rural India as per 2001 census. Of the total workforce in the country, 66 per cent are in 
agriculture, which contributes about 27 per cent of the GDP. This obviously explains why 
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a large section of the rural people has low income. The challenge before the Indian 
economy in the face of growing liberalization and free trade agreements world over, is 
therefore, to canalize resources for sustained growth of the economy and more 
importantly reduce rural disparity.  
 
Demand for credit 
 
There are three segments of demand for rural credit in India (Mahajan: 1997). At the base 
are the asset poor and asset less rural landless households who are either engaged as 
seasonal labourers in agriculture, mining, quarrying and the casual workers. The basic 
credit requirement of this section is for consumption purpose during days of no-work and 
for other contingencies like sickness, social obligations like marriage etc. However, there 
is also demand for production credit from this group which essentially caters to the 
requirements for acquiring small productive assets, such as livestock, through which 
additional income can be generated.  
 
The second group comprises the small and marginal farmers, rural artisans, weavers and 
petty traders. The main credit requirement for this group is for working capital 
(production credit). However, there is requirement for consumption credit also though the 
size and frequency is comparatively smaller than the earlier group. The demand for 
consumption credit is essentially for meeting expenses on social obligations and 
functions. 
 
The third group comprises small and medium farmers and also small salaried job holders. 
However, while the credit requirement of the farmer class is for production purpose, the 
salaried small job holders require credit for consumption requirement mostly in terms of 
acquiring some consumer durable assets or any social obligatory expenses. 
 
It may be noted here that among the three groups, the medium farmers from the third 
group have been able to access the formal banking institutions for obtaining credit. 
However, the credit so obtained is purely for production purpose in respect of his farming 
uses. Therefore, a major demand component for credit in rural India which is for 
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consumption purpose is, however, not available for these groups of people from the 
formal institutional sources.  
Moreover, the demand for short term credit is higher in rural areas since fast cash is 
needed in all transactions and, liquidity preference of rural households for transaction 
motive suffers from liquid cash due to low income. 
 
Credit Intervention in rural markets 
 
In India, the rural production system has been injected with subsidized finance through 
financial institutions. The end result of which has been a defaulting credit system, 
squeezing the viability and sustainability of the rural banking system. The whole idea of 
cocessional credit to rural areas has been advocated with the objective of releasing the 
rural poor and marginalized from the clutches of usurious moneylenders comprising the 
large farmers, resource rich village traders etc. and create a space for credit access to the 
marginalized and poor section.  
 
The subsidized credit of the formal institutional sources tied to poverty alleviation 
programme of the government and schematic lending have created multi agency problem 
and problem of moral hazard in the rural credit market of India (Choudhury: 2004). 
Adverse selection of beneficiaries, political interference, financing of non viable 
activities have not only eroded banks credibility and business worthiness, it has also 
sapped the competitive spirit and entrepreneurial drive to fend for ones own in the rural 
areas. The resultant effect of this has been a distressed situation in the rural areas. The 
distressfulness in rural areas is corroborated by the fact that during 1999-2000, at all-
India level, 40.85% of the rural households were without cultivated land as against 
38.74% in the previous survey round in 1993-94. The average land size possessed by a 
rural household in India is 0.84 hectares but 41.1 per cent of the rural households 
possessed land sizes of 0.01-0.20 hectares as revealed by the NSS 55th Round. The 
average size of land cultivated (per cultivating household) was 0.18 hectare during 1999-
2000 as against 0.23 hectare in the 1993-94.  While this indicates the increase in number 
of rural households in terms of loss in asset ownership, the NSS 55th Round data on rural 
indebtedness shows that average amount of debt per indebted household has increased 
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from Rs.3169.00 in 1993-94 to Rs.8215.00 in 1999-2000 even though there has been a 
marked decrease in the percentage of indebted households from 35 percent in 1993-94 to 
25 percent in 1999-2000. This increase in the size of the debt clearly reflects the credit 
size expansion in the rural areas. 
According to conventional theories of market, an effective market is one where both 
buyers and sellers have equal presence and, the pay-off matrix places both on an 
optimum level of satisfaction. In India rural credit market has been unprofitable for 
schematic subsidised lending of the government. In making concessional credit, it is more 
pertinent to ask what should be the right measure and approach of such credit. If it is 
poverty alleviation, the policies for rural credit need to look into the credit needs of 
households below poverty level. If it is creating employment, then the product market 
and the linkages to rural areas need to be studied before doling credit.  
Regional growth policy and rural credit market: theoretical underpinning 
It is an undeniable fact that the informal sources like the money lenders charge high rates 
of interest from the rural borrowers, vast majority of who are both cash poor as well as 
asset poor. The subsidised credit programme and the regional rural banks were 
introduced primarily to relieve the poor borrowers from unequal terms of trade with the 
money lenders. The role of the money lenders and the banks in the rural credit market can 
be analysed from the theoretical rationale of the regional growth policy. There are two 
approaches in fostering the growth potential in this respect- first by upgrading the local 
infrastructure especially the outreach in the rural areas to reduce the cost disability of the 
rural areas and second, through introduction of suitable credit products. Regional policies 
of the first type are supplemented by expansion of the rural branches. However, whether 
such a policy has the desired local effect is determined by the relationship between the 
provisions of the accessibility infrastructure, the marginal cost and revenue effects of the 
changes in accessibility costs on the indigenous local supplier and the non-indigenous 
localized inter-regional firms (McCann: 2001). Therefore in an ideal situation of the first 
type, investment in accessibility infrastructure will induce credit flow by non-indigenous 
localized inter-regional firms by reducing the cost disability. Further the credit promotion 
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through subsidised products is assumed to reduce the marginal cost and increase marginal 
return for the borrowers and hence generate demand for credit from these firms. 
However, while addressing these issues in rural credit market, the crucial aspect that has 
been left behind is the input substitution factor (different types of credit products mainly 
production credit) in the rural areas. If firms (banks) have a zero or weak factor input 
substitution effect, localized reduction in accessibility cost will be absorbed by the firms 
(banks) by moving away from the region to regions with higher availability of factor 
input substitutes notwithstanding the accessibility cost as because high factor input 
substitution effect nullifies the accessibility cost differentials. This is the ideal Weber 
type result, which effectively holds good at present for rural credit market in India. The 
financial sector liberalization in the wake of the structural reforms has precisely led to 
credit squeeze in the rural areas. This is due to the fact that demand for production credit 
in the rural areas is low and hence factor input substitutability process for the firms 
(banks). The major reason being rural demand for credit is essentially for consumption 
purpose more specifically household consumption and social ceremonies like marriage 
etc. Therefore, when firms (banks) have wide range of substitution possibilities together 
with low accessibility disability cost on a comparative basis between two regions (rural 
and urban), firms will tend to move towards the region where it has a lower rate of 
disability cost and higher possibility of substitution. In case of rural areas this has been 
the case, which is a classic case of the Moses-type result that is entirely in keeping with 
perspective of regional growth policy. Geography therefore plays an important role in 
determining the spatial distribution and absolute quantum of economic impacts of 
regional growth policies. The money lenders by virtue of the localized spatial 
concentration have the advantage of low cost disability in terms of outreach and also high 
factor input substitution. The substitution effect is achieved by offering different quantum 
of credit with respect to purpose, rates of interest depending on the borrower’s repayment 
capacity. This is facilitated by the informal structure of the money lender’s business 
unlike the rules defined process of the formal banks. The low rate of information access 
coupled with high cost of accessibility led to mounting overdues in the rural bank 
branches. The structural reforms of the financial sector and the introduction of prudential 
norms led to merger and closure of many rural bank branches. The rural poor were thus 
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further pushed into tight corners as whatever remote possibility of availing subsidised 
credit existed for them by virtue of a bank office in their local area also closed down. The 
question therefore is what options remain for rural poor?   
In the emerging situation where the formal agencies have been gradually reducing their 
outreach in the rural markets in the wake of present financial liberalization (e.g. the total 
credit outstanding for all scheduled commercial banks in India as on March, 2006 rural 
India accounted for 8.4 percent), the informal agencies remain the other source. In any 
business transaction information is the key word. The money lenders enjoy the 
information advantage of their borrower clientele due to their spatial location. Given the 
large size of the rural borrower class and a comparative small supplier group of money 
lenders, it is obvious that the supplier will always look for the highest remunerative 
option. Studies on rural credit market have shown that high rate of interest on the loan is 
not a deterrent rather it is the timeliness of the product availability. As the informal lender 
can supply the product at easy time this brings down the transaction cost in terms of 
person hours/visits spent compared to the formal agency 
In the present era of liberalization, when rural expenditure of the government has been 
dwindling, decrying the role of the informal agencies notwithstanding their financial 
intermediation in the process will deny livelihood access to the rural poor and lead to 
starvation of the rural economy. However, this is not to defend the informal sources, but 
given the market where there is high demand and low supply, one has to appreciate the 
fact that high interest rates charged by the money lenders has in fact created a multiplier 
effect in generating operating funds for further credit accessibility of the rural poor.  
Sustainability of money lenders in rural credit market 
Market is a function of demand and supply hence, sustainability of the market depends on 
the customer base of the market. In understanding the sustainability of rural money 
lenders it is important to look into client base which generates the demand for the money 
lenders credit supply.  
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Of the total households in rural India, approximately 41 percent of the households are 
without any cultivable land. Further of the total rural labour households (RLH) 41 percent 
are with cultivable land while 59 percent are without any cultivable land. In respect of the 
agricultural labour household (ALH) 43 percent have cultivable land and 57 percent have 
no cultivable land.   
The distribution of RLHs by their usual occupation show that majority of the members of 
households are without occupation.  At all-India level, out of the average household size 
of 4.67 persons, 2.69 persons were without occupation during 1999-2000.  A similar 
pattern is obtained in case of ALH, at all-India level, for an average household size of 
4.65 persons (all-classes), 2.61 persons was without occupation. The percentage 
distribution of persons by usual occupation and possession of land in respect of RLHs 
and ALHs revealed that the majority of the persons in these households were without 
occupation. At all-India level, 57.12 percent of the persons with cultivable land were 
without occupation while 57.91 percent of the persons without cultivable land were 
without occupation in respect of RLH. In respect of ALH, 56.29 percent of the 
households with land and 56.03 percent of the households without land were without 
occupation. The data bespeaks of the distress livelihood scenario in the rural areas.  
In respect of   indebtedness the NSS 55th Round indicate that there has been a decline in 
the incidence of rural indebted households while there has been a sharp increase in the 
size of debt per indebted household. The distribution of rural indebtedness by sources 
shows that while 34 percent and 31 percent of the RLH and ALH respectively were 
indebted to the money lenders banks accounted for only 17 percent of rural indebtedness. 
A comparative analysis on the rural indebtedness by source shows that except during the 
period of the 3rd Rural Labour Enquiry (RLE-1977-78) which was the post RRB period 
and that the incidence of dependence on money lenders showed a decrease for the first 
time in India. During the 4th RLE (1983) when IRDP was launched which incidentally 
had been the biggest rural development programme in India the indebtedness of the rural 
households to money lenders were reported to be even lower than that of the banks. This 
decrease needs no explanation as evaluation study of IRDP has thrown enough light on 
its performance and efficacy. As the make good, look good aura of IRDP could not 
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sustain for long, and the banks were caught up with non recovery of loans and mounting 
overdues, the 4th RLE (1987-88) showed a reversal of the 1983 trend and a steady 
increase on the money lenders incidence of debt supply. The in famous ARDR 1990 
which apparently relieved the rural borrowers however brought the much needed succor 
to the commercial banks as non recovery turned detrimental for the banking system with 
the rural defaulters remaining nonchalant. Following the financial sector liberalization in 
1992, there has been severe credit squeeze in the rural areas by the commercial banks in 
the country as a whole. As per the RBI Quarterly Report March, 2006, of the total credit 
outstanding for all scheduled commercial banks (ASCB) rural India accounted for 8.4 
percent against a deposit share of 11 percent. In 1992, the share of ASCB credit in rural 
areas was 13.63 percent while the same for deposit was 14.98 percent. Fourteen years 
after the financial sector reforms the emerging trend sows that rural areas have been 
increasingly falling behind in respect of credit accessibility.  
The purpose wise breakup of the indebtedness shows that household consumption and 
social ceremonies like marriage etc. have always been the two important reasons for rural 
indebtedness, and even today almost 55 percent of the total rural household loans are 
taken to meet the requirements for these two purposes. The sustainability of money 
lenders is embedded in these two purposive credit requirements of the rural households 
which the commercial banks in the rural areas can barely address.  
Further, the growing landlessness in the rural areas have constricted the rural households 
in obtaining bank credit for any production purpose which explains the reason for 
growing incidence of indebtedness to the money lenders. Also the incidence of 
indebtedness is directly related to the expenditure level of the rural households. As per 
the NSS 55th Round data, rural labour households up to monthly per capita expenditure 
class of Rs.300.00, the incidence of indebtedness is less than the average incidence for all 
expenditure classes in India. The incidence of indebtedness increases with the 
expenditure class. The decrease in the overall incidence of rural indebtedness to a quarter 
of the rural households does not confirm a betterment of rural life- rather it is on the 
contrary. There are two supporting evidences: first, 98 percent of the debts were 
contracted by the households instead of being inherited and second, as indebtedness is 
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directly related to expenditure, therefore in a situation of growing landlessness and no 
occupation among rural households, the capacity to borrow even from money lenders is 
getting constricted.  
In lieu of conclusion 
The LPG of the Indian economy has further pressed the rural economy. That the market 
forces and various institutional agencies of the liberalised economic structure will bring 
its own distributive justice in such distressed rural market is too idealistic postulation. 
Instead of launching rural employment generation programmes and schemes across the 
country, and inject some cash into the hands of rural households which is highly 
unsustainable as confirmed by the experience of IRDP, it is important that spatial 
dimensions of the rural markets are first addressed by assessing the needs for social 
overhead capital (SOC) and its synchronicity with directly productive activities (DPA). 
The reason being that the transport/accessibility cost (of SOC) and factor input 
substitution (of DPA) are two important determinants of any market intervention.  
Therefore, the real issue before rural credit market is not the presence or absence of 
money lenders but the synchronicity between SOC and DPA to ensure the sustainability 
of wage employment schemes to redress the rural poor which have so far been the 
missing link.  
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RURAL LABOUR ENQUIRY REPORT ON GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS 
OF RURAL LABOUR HOUSEHOLDS (55th Round of N.S.S.) 1999-2000 
 
Table: 1 - Rural Indebtedness  
 
 
Items 
Agricultural Labour Households Rural Labour Households 
1st 
RLE 
2nd 
RLE 
3rd 
RLE 
4th 
RLE 
5th 
RLE 
6th 
RLE 
7th 
RLE 
1st 
RLE 
2nd 
RLE 
3rd 
RLE 
4th 
RLE 
5th 
RLE 
6th 
RLE 7th RLE 
1963-
65 
1974-
75 
1977-
78 1983 
1987-
88 
1993-
94 
1999-
2000  
1963-
65 
1974-
75 
1977-
78 1983 
1987-
88 
1993-
94 1999 -2000 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Percentage 
of indebted 
households 
60.6 66.4 52.3 51.1 39.4 35.5 25.1 59.2 65.4 50.5 50.4 39.1 35.1 25.0 
Average  
debt per 
household(in 
Rs) 
148 387 345 774 769 1031 1312 148 395 348 806 787 1113 1515 
Average 
debt  per 
indebted 
household 
(in Rs)- 
244 584 660 1516 1952 2901 5230 251 605 690 1598 2014 3169 6049 
Table: 1.1- Percentage of rural debt by purpose 
 Agricultural Labour Households Rural Labour Households 
 
1963-
65 
1974-
75 
1977-
78 1983 
1987-
88 1993-94 
1999-
2000  
1963-
65 
1974-
75 
1977-
78 1983 
1987-
88 
1993-
94 1999 -2000  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Household 
consumption 53.3  48.1  44.4  30.4 34.3  32.3  31.0  51.8  47.0  42.9  32.0 33.6  29.9  27.6 
Marriage & 
other ceremonies 24.2 18.8 22.3 14.7 13.8 17.1 24.1 24.7 19.3 22.9 15.5 15.4  17.8  24.0 
Productive 
purposes 11.9  12.7  20.9  41.4 29.1  28.3  21.5  12.0  12.7  20.4  38.2 26.9  25.3  18.5 
Land purchase & 
constr. of 
building 
- - - 6.3  8.5  10.0  14.6  - - - 7.6  11.1  15.0  21.0 
Repayment of 
debt - - - - 1.2  1.7  1.0  - - - - 1.1  1.8  1.0 
Others purposes 10.6  20.4  12.4  7.2  13.1  10.6  7.8  11.5  21.0  13.8  6.7  11.9  10.2  7.9 
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Table: 1.2-Percentage of debt by source 
Items 
Agricultural Labour Households Rural Labour Households 
1963-
65 
1974-
75 
1977-
78 1983 
1987-
88 
1993-
94 1999-2000  
1963-
65 
1974-
75 
1977-
78 1983 
1987-
88 
1993-
94 1999 -2000 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Government - - - 2.9  3.6  8.2  4.1  - - - 4.1  3.6  8.3  5.4  
Co-
operative 
societies 
4.9  5.3  8.6  7.9  10.0  7.0  10.3  5.6  5.6  9.4  10.2  9.4  7.9  13.1  
Employers 19.7  10.1  7.0  13.9  13.0  12.2  7.9  17.9  9.6  6.7  12.2  12.2  11.4  6.9  
Money 
lenders 30.7  47.8  37.3  18.6  22.0  29.4  34.0  31.9  46.4  36.7  21.3  21.7  27.6  31.7  
Shop-
keepers 7.4  6.7  6.7  4.6  7.7  6.9  6.9  8.4  7.3  6.8  5.3  9.2  7.3  7.1  
Banks - 3.6  6.0  33.3  21.0  20.7  16.6  - 4.0  6.5  28.0  20.8  18.9  17.2  
Relatives & 
friends - - - 10.8  13.7  12.9  16.1  - - - 11.6  14.4  12.4  15.1  
Others 37.3  26.5  34.4  8.0  9.0  2.8  4.0  36.2  27.1  33.9  7.3  8.7  6.2  3.5  
